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I. INTRODUCTION

Mediation has gained substantial recognition in recent years as an efficient alternative dispute resolution technique. The technique uses a neutral third
party to facilitate resolution by encouraging and assisting parties in reaching
their own mutually acceptable agreements. The settlement process relies upon
an informal, non-adversarial atmosphere that fosters dependable and effective
communication, which ensures productive working relationships among all interested participants. Of course, key to the Preservation of this crucial atmosphere is the concept of total confidentiality regarding communications made
3
during the mediation.
Despite the informal nature of the mediation process, a successful outcome leads to a formal settlement agreement enforceable against all involved
parties. Occasionally, the participants in a mediation disagree on what they settled, or, even if the terms of a settlement are acknowledged, one party may challenge their validity on the grounds of fraud, duress, or lack of authority.4 Thus,
when disputes arise over the enforcement of mediated settlement agreements,
courts often apply traditional contract law principles in order to decipher the
truth behind each settlement. These traditional contract principles often need
the admission of evidence of what transpired during the mediation, leading
many scholars to question the wisdom of maintaining total confidentiality when
subsequent disputes arise over the enforcement of mediated agreements. 5 In
particular, these scholars are calling for an exception to mediation confidentiality that would require the mediator to testify in certain agreement enforcement
I
See, e.g., Cassondra E. Joseph, The Scope of Mediator Immunity: When Mediators Can
Invoke Absolute Immunity, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 629, 629 (1997).
2
Confidentiality protects a wide range of communications including those between the participants during the mediation as well as those outside the mediation as to third parties. Due to the
complexity of this topic, this Comment will focus on the scope of confidentiality as it applies to
outside communications after the mediation session, mainly the right of the mediator to refuse to
answer questions in court.
3
See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law
Collides With Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 33, 35 (2001) ("One of the fundamental
axioms of mediation is the importance of confidentiality.").
4

Id. at41.

5

See id; see also Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform MediationAct: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REv. 9 (2001); Peter Robinson, Centuries of Contract Common Law Can't Be
All Wrong: Why the UMA 's Exception to Mediation Confidentiality in Enforcement Proceedings
Should be Embraced and Broadened,2003 J. Disp. RESOL. 135; Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing
Rights Generated in Court-ConnectedMediation-Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private
FacilitativeProcess and the Reality of PublicAdversarialJustice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL.

509 (2004).
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• 6
proceedings. This criticism has apparently sparked a debate pitting the funda-

of fosmental goal of enforcing mediated agreements on one side, and the goal
7
other.
the
on
agreements
those
reaching
for
process
tering an effective
Specifically, the debate addresses the difficult balance between preserving the confidentiality of the mediation process and allowing access to the use of
mediator testimony when it would aid in the enforcement of mediated agreements. On one side of the argument, confidentiality advocates argue that mediaproceedings.8
tor testimony should play no role at all in agreement enforcement
This approach is concerned with preserving the informal nature, neutrality, and
open communication central to the mediation process. 9 On the other side, advocates of applying traditional contract law to agreement enforcement proceedings
argue that courts should have access to all pertinent information when ruling on

the validity of mediated agreements. 10 In other words, this argument calls for an
exception to mediation confidentiality when the testimony of a mediator might
constitute a valuable asset to a court's ability to decipher the truth."I In response, the debate forces a balancing of the type and magnitude of harm from

compelling the mediator to testify against the harm that would result12if the mediator's testimony were not accessible in an enforcement proceeding.
As mediation continues to gain popularity, it becomes increasingly important to define the degree to which rules of privilege protect mediation confidentiality. Due to inconsistency throughout the country, a mediator is currently

unable to guarantee that he or she will keep everything said in a mediation session confidential if a dissatisfied participant later subpoenas a mediator to tes6

See Deason, supra note 3, at 90-96; Hughes, supranote 5, at 64-77; Robinson, supra note 5,

at 171-73.
7
See Deason, supra note 3, at 35-36.
8

Many scholars view a broad mediator testimonial privilege as a necessary ingredient to the

mediation process. See, e.g., Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in
Mediation: The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 37, 40-45 (1986); Eileen P.
Friedman, Protection of Confidentiality in the Mediation of Minor Disputes, 11 CAP. U. L. REV.
181, 196-212 (1981); Alan Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transformationfrom Theory to
Implementation: Designinga Mediation Privilege Standardto Protect Mediation Participants,the
Process and the PublicInterest, 1995 J. DiSp. RESOL. 1, 15-20.
See Ellen E. Deason, The Questfor Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality:Foolish Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 79-85 (2001) ("[T]he challenge of
communicating with an adversary, the presence of a neutral intermediary, and the potential for
information informally reaching a judge all make confidentiality especially important for mediation.").
10
See Robinson, supra note 5, at 149-60.
9

11

See id.

12

See Rinaker v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (introducing

a balancing test pitting the public policy of mediation confidentiality against other public policy
values).
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tify. 13 However, in West Virginia, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals14
recently offered some much needed guidance in the case Riner v. Newbraugh.
In Riner, the court provides some indirect criticism concerning the use of mediator testimony, which in turn clarifies that in West Virginia state courts mediator
confidentiality will15 continue to take precedence in future agreement enforce-

ment proceedings.

This Comment addresses the continuing development of law regarding
16
the place of mediator testimony in the enforcement of mediated agreements.

Part II addresses the importance of confidentiality to the mediation process.
Part III discusses the role of traditional contract law principles in the enforcement of mediated agreements and the possible advantages of allowing mediator

testimony in this enforcement. Next, Part IV offers some examples of the different approaches used by various jurisdictions throughout the country. Finally,
Part V examines West Virginia law and breaks down how the Riner opinion
may provide some much needed consistency for the future of mediation in this
state.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE MEDIATION

PROCESS

Mediation is generally defined as "an informal, non-adversarial process
whereby a neutral third person, the mediator, assists disputing parties to resolve
by agreement or examine some or all of the differences between them."' 17 In
13

See Deason, supra note 3, at 102 ("Parties are currently hampered in predicting confidenti-

ality by huge variations among jurisdictions in the form and scope of both protections for mediation confidentiality and contract doctrine for settlement enforcement."). It should be noted that in
order to provide a little security, some mediators require a signed contract from the participants
stating that the participants will not call the mediator as a witness under any circumstances. Interview with Debra Scudiere, Kay Casto & Chaney PLLC, in Morgantown, W. Va. (Dec. 10, 2003).
However, these contracts do not necessarily create judicially-recognized protection. See Paul
Dayton Johnson, Jr., Note and Comment, Confidentiality in Mediation: What can Florida Glean
from the Uniform Mediation Act?, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 487, 490 (2003). Courts have often
held similar confidentiality agreements unenforceable as a matter of public policy. See id.
14
563 S.E.2d 802 (W. Va. 2002).
is

Id. at 808-09.

16
Four authors whose contributions to the topic of mediation have greatly benefited the author
are Ellen E. Deason (See supranotes 3 and 9), Scott H. Hughes (See supra note 5), Madeleine H.
Johnson (Student Work, What's a Mediator to Do? Adopting Ethical Guidelinesfor West Virginia
Mediators, 106 W. VA. L. RnV. 177 (2003)), and Peter Robinson (See supra note 5).
17
W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.02; see also UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § (2)(1) (2001), available at
http://www.law.upenn.eduibll/ulc/mediat/UMA200l.htm ("Mediation means a process in which a
mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist them in reaching a
voluntary agreement regarding their dispute."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining "mediation" as "[a] method of nonbinding dispute resolution involving a neutral third
party who tries to help the disputing parties reach a mutually agreeable solution").
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defining the role of the mediator, the West Virginia rule states, "[t]he role of the
mediator is to encourage and assist the parties to reach their own mutually acceptable resolution by facilitating communication, helping to clarify issues and
interests, identifying what additional information should be collected or exchanged, fostering joint problem-solving, exploring resolution alternatives, and
other similar means." 18 Naturally, the concept of confidentiality is regarded as
fundamental to the preservation of the "informal, non-adversarial" nature of the
mediation process that enables the mediator to perform these crucial functions.
Specifically, confidentiality provides three main safeguards for preserving the
crucial mediation atmosphere: (1)it ensures that parties view mediation procedures separately from judicial procedures; (2) it maintains the "neutrality" of the
(3) it encourages effective communication among the various
mediator;• .and
19
participants.
A.

DistinguishingMediation ProceduresFrom JudicialProcedures

First, in order for the participants to view mediation as an "informal,
non-adversarial" process, it is imperative that mediation be distinguished from
normal judicial procedure. In contrast to adjudication, "mediation is essentially
a form of negotiation."2 0 The parties retain the power to shape the agenda for
discussion,.-and21any agreement reached is done so voluntarily through party selfdetermination. Unlike a judge, a mediator acts primarily as a
catalyst for this process; he cannot compel the production of information, and he does not render judgment by applying preordained rules to the dispute after hearing reasoned argument. Instead, he helps the parties reach agreement by identifying issues, exploring possible bases for agreement and the consequences of not settling, and encouraging each party to accommodate the interests of other parties.
Indeed, mediation needs to be viewed as a consensual process in which
the disputing parties decide the resolution of their dispute themselves, as op-

1S

W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.02.

19

See Deason, supra note 9, at 79-85.

20

Note, See Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441, 443 (December

1984).
21
See id at 444; see also Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting "Good Faith"
Reports Under the Uniform Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel Out of the Mediation
Tent, 2003 J. DisP. RESOL. 67, 80-82.
22

Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 20, at 444.
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posed to having a ruling imposed upon them by a stranger. 23 As various scholars have noted, mediation, unlike litigation, empowers the disputants. 24 Thus, in
order to promote successful mediation, the participants must understand that
mediation offers a unique problem solving structure that ordinary civil litigation
does not.
Confidentiality aids the non-adversarial atmosphere of mediation by
"keeping the judging function separate from the mediation function." 25 In other
words, without the assurances of confidentiality, parties may fear that their con26
versations with the mediator could be conveyed informally to the trier of fact.
This problem is multiplied if the parties face a bench trial in the event that they
fail to settle their suit. 27 For instance, if mediator testimony were allowed in
subsequent proceedings, participants might feel as though the judge will rely on
the mediator's account of the settlement attempt too heavily. This fear effectively cloaks the mediator with an unfair sense of "settlement coercion," which
is contrary to the voluntary nature of the mediation process. Confidentiality
ensures participants that a mediator is not performing judge-like analysis,
thereby guaranteeing that an unsuccessful mediation attempt will not come back
to haunt either side of the dispute.
B.

MaintainingMediatorNeutrality

Confidentiality also serves a second very important function by defining
the mediator's role as a neutral, non-aligned participant. 29 The appearance and
reality of mediator neutrality are "essential to generating the climate of trust
necessary for effective mediation." 30 Without mediator neutrality, participants
would show reluctance to participate in mediation, mainly because participants
will only confide in a mediator
who does not appear to be partisan or in a posi31
tion to serve other interests.

23

See Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau & Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (N.Y. 1993) (recog-

nizing a societal benefit from the parties shaping their own agreement rather than having one
judicially imposed).
24
See, e.g., Izumi & La Rue, supra note 21, at 81; Thompson, supra note 5, at 510.
25

Deason, supra note 9, at 83.

26

See id.

27

See id.

28

See Izumi & La Rue, supra note 21, at 82.

29

See, e.g., Deason, supra note 9, at 82-83.

3D

Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation,supra note 20, at 446.

31

See Deason, supra note 3, at 36-37.
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Requiring mediator testimony in court proceedings poses a danger of
undermining the parties' confidence in the mediator's impartiality. 32 If mediators were required to testify about their activities, "not even the strictest adherence to purely factual matters would prevent the evidence from favoring or
Additionally, a mediator has a finanseeming to favor one side or the other."
cial interest in preserving neutrality because a biased reputation might jeopardize the ability of the mediator to present himself as a neutral party in the future. 34 In turn, members of the local legal community are unlikely to seek the
mediator's services in future conflicts. These concerns have led at least one
solely on the grounds that it would inhibit
court to refuse mediator testimony
35
future "mediator effectiveness."
C.

Encouraging Effective Communication

A third advantage of providing confidentiality in the mediation
- process,
36
Reand perhaps the most important, is the fostering of open communication.
member that the roles of the mediator often include facilitating communication,
helping to clarify issues and interests, identifying what additional information
should be collected or exchanged, fostering joint problem-solving, and exploring settlement alternatives. 37 In order for the mediator to achieve these goals,
the participants must approach a mediation session with candor, or a disposition
of open-mindedness. 38 As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit explained:
If participants cannot rely on the confidential treatment of everything that transpires during [mediation] sessions then counsel
of necessity will feel constrained to conduct themselves in a
cautious, tight-lipped, non-committal manner more suitable to
32

See id- at 37.

33

Id. (quoting Tomlinson of High Point, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 681, 688 (1947)).

34

See Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 20, at 446, 455-56; see also
Hughes, supra note 5, at 37 ("The consequences will usually occur after the completion of the
mediation and so any negative impact on the perceived impartiality will not be detrimental to a
mediator vis-d-vis one-time disputants, but may adversely affect a mediator who works in a small
community or is frequently employed by the same parties.").
35

See NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that an important
public policy underlying an independent mediator privilege for labor mediation is the preservation
of "mediator effectiveness").
36
See generally Deason, supra note 9, at 80.

37

See supranotes 17-19 and accompanying text.
38 In other words, mediation's dispute-resolving capabilities thrive upon the parties feeling as
though they can be frank or open with the mediator. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 5, at 565.
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poker players in a high-stakes game than to adversaries attempting to arrive at a just resolution of a civil dispute. This atmosphere if allowed to exist would surely destroy the effectiveness
39
of [the] program ....
Confidentiality discourages this "poker player" attitude by ensuring the privacy
of conversations between the parties and the mediator.
To illustrate, confidentiality becomes particularly important when mediators try to get parties to discuss the aspects of their case in private caucuses.
In order for mediation to be successful, "the parties must feel sure that anything
said in private caucus with the mediator is as confidential as they desire.
Without confidentiality, participants would refuse to disclose the possible
strengths and weaknesses of their respective positions out of fear that they might
be communicated to the other side, or, even worse, to a judge or jury at a later
court appearance. This cautious behavior would certainly prove detrimental to
the settlement of the dispute.
Along these same lines, confidentiality "serves to protect the mediation
program from being used as a discovery tool for creative attomeys." 4 1 "Without
adequate legal protection, a party's candor in mediation might well be 'rewarded' by a discovery request or the revelation of mediation information at
trial."4 2 Confidentiality ensures that parties are free to explore settlement possibilities without worrying about the courtroom 43advantages that the other side
might gain if their exploration does not succeed.
In sum, confidentiality helps to achieve an informal and non-adversarial
process by distinguishing the mediation process from the judicial process, maintaining the neutrality of the mediator, and encouraging open communication
among the various participants. Accordingly, it is not surprising that confidentiality is regarded as an essential component to the mediation phenomenon. In
fact, state legislatures have enacted numerous statutes and rules creating a variety of privile es and protections for communications made during mediation
proceedings. In addition, all federal district courts and courts of appeals offer
mediation programs protected by confidentiality. 45 However, as discussed be39
40

Lake Utopia Paper Ltd. v. Connelly Containers, Inc., 608 F.2d 928, 930 (2d Cir. 1979).
See ProtectingConfidentiality in Mediation, supra note 20, at 454.

42

In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 636 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id. (quoting Kirtley, supranote 8, at 9-10).

43

See, e.g., Deason, supra note 9, at 81.

41

See infra Part IV.A.; see also SARAH R. COLE ET. AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY &
PRACTICE apps. A and B (2d ed. Supp. 2003); Pamela A. Kentra, HearNo Evil, See No Evil, Speak
No Evil: The IntolerableConflictfor Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty to Maintain Mediation
Confidentiality and the Duty to Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REv. 715 app.
44

45

See infra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
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protections offered under these confidentiality provisions differ
low, the various
46
substantially.
III.

THE ARGUMENT FOR AN "AGREEMENT ENFORCEMENT" EXCEPTION TO
THE MEDIATOR PRIVILEGE

Despite overwhelming agreement over the importance of confidentiality
in the mediation process, some jurisdictions create exceptions that allow media47
The
tor testimony during the enforcement of disputed mediated agreements.
if
you
do
process
mediation
a
confidential
does
good
What
rationale is simple:
sugsome
a
result,
As
process?
that
of
outcome
the
cannot effectively enforce
gest that confidentiality should yield to a "demonstrable need for parol evidence
the parties to a mediation agreement sues to enforce or rescind that
when one of
' '8
A
agreement.
A.

The Role of ContractLaw in the MediationProcess

Clearly, the underlying goal behind mediation is to resolve disputes and
achieve settlements. When a court enforces a mediated agreement, it is affirming the effectiveness of the mediation process and reinforcing the participants'
incentives to mediate. 49 Thus, appropriate enforcement "encourage[s] parties in
the future to take mediations seriously, to understand that they represent real
opportunities to reach closure and avoid trial, and to attend carefully to terms of
agreements proposed in mediations." 50 Traditional contract law principles ensure that mediated agreements are treated and enforced as real contracts, thereby
protecting them from vulnerability. 51 Moreover, traditional contract law incorporates centuries of experience helpful in determining the true character of these
agreements.52 For example, contract law helps define the conditions necessary
for: the formation of a binding agreement; declaring a binding agreement void
based on public policy; the meanings of the specific terms of a binding agreement; the effect of performance and nonperformance; impracticability of pernovation. 53
formance and frustration of purpose; and assignment, delegation, or
46

See infra Part IV.

47

See infra Part IV.B.

48

Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, supra note 20, at 452.

49

See Deason, supra note 3, at 37.

so

Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 1999).

51

See Robinson, supra note 5, at 148 ("The law of contracts consists of the collection of re-

quirements that define when a commitment rises to the level of triggering legal enforceability.").
52

See id.

53

Id. at 149-59 (providing a thorough analysis of contract law's application in these situa-
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Another value to keep in mind is the "fundamental understanding of
mediation as a consensual process." 54 Although mediation is an informal procedure, parties are still allowed to assert common-law defenses such as fraud,
duress, lack of capacity, or any other claim that may invalidate consent to an
agreement.
Traditional contract law ensures the validity of the mediation
process by providing a forum for disgruntled parties to void contracts entered
into without consent. Thus, traditional contract law advances the important interests of mediation by providing a framework for enforcing valid
settlement
56
agreements and embodying society's views of appropriate consent.
B.

Should Mediator Testimony Play a Role in the Application of Traditional ContractLaw?

While traditional contract law obviously has a place in the enforcement
of mediated agreements, the role of mediator testimony in these time-honored
contract principles is not as clear. Some commentators argue that excluding
mediator testimony from enforcement proceedings has the effect of excluding
valuable parol evidence essential to a court's ability to decipher the truth.
This, it is argued, violates the modem contract approach of 58using a "totality of
the circumstances" when deciphering settlement agreements.
Specifically, it is arguable that the exemption of mediators from subsequent enforcement proceedings has the effect of excluding meaningful information from the only possible "neutral" witness to the agreement. For example,
when a party is not permitted to introduce evidence from the "neutral" observer,
a party may be hard pressed to prove an alleged defect, such as a missing term
or invalid consent, in the mediated agreement. 59 With this in mind, one commentator has suggested that a ban on mediator testimony might interfere with
tions).
54

See Deason, supra note 3, at 38.

See id; see also FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (N.D. Tex. 1999). For an overview of the issues associated with applying these "appropriate consent" principles to the mediation
context, see Thompson, supra note 5, at 527-39.
56
See Deason, supra note 3, at 37-38 ("Thus traditional contract law, which provides a
55

framework for enforcing properly reached agreements and refusing to enforce invalid agreements,

distills important interests that apply in the context of mediation as well as in other contract settings.").
57

See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.

In interpreting contracts, "courts have looked well beyond information within the four corners of a settlement document, examining factors regarding the parties and their representatives,
the attitude of the parties, and the surrounding circumstances of the negotiations leading up to the
settlement." Robinson, supra note 5, at 150.
59
See Thompson, supra note 5,at 523 (arguing that "there is a type of presumption that assumes the validity and enforceability of settlement agreements ending litigation").
58
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the application of contract law in at least the following circumstances: (1) conflicting factual testimony by the parties; (2) mediations 60with a prevalence of
private meetings; and (3) complex multi-party mediations.
1.

Conflicting Factual Testimony Between the Parties

First, hearings about whether a particular issue was discussed at a mediation session or disputes over an alleged clerical error in a written mediation
agreement might result in conflicting testimony between the parties. Without
mediator testimony, a court will most likely decide the case by finding one witness more credible than the other or that there is no agreement because of a lack
of mutual assent. 6 1 In this situation, allowing mediator testimony might provide
a valuable alternative to either of these drastic measures.
2.

Mediations with a Prevalence of Private Meetings

Second, since mediators commonly use private caucuses with each
party, "the negotiations and discussions often critical to the application of conattorney." 62
tract law occur between the mediator and a party and/or party's
Simply stated, "[e]ven the most honest party may have a skewed perspective
and will be hard pressed toXrovide an objective characterization of his converMoreover, "[l]ess scrupulous parties could offer
sations with the mediator."
unrebuttable exaggerated testimony." 64 In turn, the absence of mediator testimony may force a trier of fact to accept false, unrebutted testimony as the truth.
Thus, the availability of the mediator's account may provide a safeguard against
any skewed testimony by a mediation participant.
3.

Complex Multi-Party Mediations

Third, it is arguable that mediator testimony may be indispensable in
complex multi-party mediations. To illustrate, some mass tort cases involve
65
Sometimes, these
hundreds of parties represented by numerous attorneys.
mediations go on for several days and consist of several different meetings with
different categories of participants. 66 Thus, one may argue that there are in60

See Robinson, supra note 5, at 172-73.

61

Id.at 172. Ironically, this was the exact result in Riner v. Newbraugh. 563 S.E.2d 802, 809

(W. Va. 2002).
Robinson, supra note 5, at 172.
62
63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 173.

66

Id.
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stances where only the mediator knows the information critical to the enforcement analysis. 67 If mediator testimony is not allowed in complex multi-party
cases, problems may arise since the mediator is the only person who knows of
each individual party's commitment. As a result, only the account of the party
attempting to renege on the agreement will be admissible, and these mediated
settlement agreements will become vulnerable contracts. 68 In other words, one
party may invalidate an otherwise valid and enforceable contract by simply expressing some type of dissatisfaction (i.e., "I never agreed to that!"). Without
mediator testimony, it may become difficult to prove the exact terms of these
complex agreements.
In sum, critics of a strict mediator privilege argue that it interferes with
an unfettered application of contract law. As a result, various jurisdictions are
unsure as to whether the possible contributions of mediator testimony outweigh
the interests surrounding mediator confidentiality.
IV. A
A.

LOOK AT VARIOUS APPROACHES USED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY

JurisdictionsRefusing to Allow Mediator Testimony About Mediation
Communications in Agreement Enforcement Proceedings

Although mediator testimony might provide a valuable contribution to
agreement enforcement proceedings, many jurisdictions still maintain a strict
mediator privilege in relation to the communications made during the mediation.
1.

State Statutory Law

First, most states make no specific exception to their confidentiality protections for the purpose of enforcing a mediated settlement agreement. Some of
these protect confidentiality through comprehensive evidentiary exclusions,
while others provide protection through specific statutes that govern mediation. 69 For example, the West Virginia Trial Court Rules specifically prohibit a
mediator from testifying about confidential communications in any dispute arising out of a mediated agreement. 70 Similar language is found in the statutes and
rules of Alabama, 7 1 Alaska,72 Indiana, 73 Nevada, 74 New Jersey, 75 North Caro67

"An example is when a mediator amalgamates confidential contributions from a group of

defendants for a global settlement." Id In these types of situations, it is imperative that each

defendant's contribution remains confidential during the mediation process since the other parties
may become irritated if they knew the exact contributions of certain defendants. Id.
68

Id.

69

See Deason, supra note 3, at 39-40.

70

See infra note 119 and accompanying text.

71 See ALA. CIV. CT. MEDIATION R. 1 (d) ("A mediator shall not be compelled in any adversary proceeding or judicial forum, including, but not limited to, a hearing on sanctions brought by
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lina,76 South Carolina,77 and Vermont.78 Other states create mediator privileges
that do provide specific exceptions, but refrain from making any type of exception for agreement enforcement proceedings.7 9 As a result, many jurisdictions
have found a way to apply common-law contract law principles without the use
of mediator testimony."u

one party against another party, to divulge the contents of documents received, viewed, or drafted
during mediation or the fact that such documents exist nor shall the mediator be otherwise compelled to testify in regard to statements made, actions taken, or positions stated by a party during
the mediation."); see also ALA. APP. CT. MEDIATION R. 8.
72

See ALASKA R. Civ. PRoc. 100(g) ("The mediator shall not testify as to any aspect of the

mediation proceedings.").
73

See IND. CODE ANN. § 4-21.5-3.5-27(a) (Michie 2003) ("A mediator is not subject to process requiring disclosure of any matter discussed during the mediation.").
74
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 48.109(3) (Michie 2003) ("A mediator is not subject to civil
process requiring the disclosure of any matter discussed during the mediation proceedings.").
75

See N.J. CT. R. 1:40-4(c) ("No mediator may participate in any subsequent hearing or trial
of the mediated matter or appear as witness or counsel for any person in the same or any related

matter.").
76

See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-110(b) (2004) (No mediator shall be compelled to testify or pro-

duce evidence in any civil proceeding concerning statements made and conduct occurring in a
").
mediation ....
77
See S.C. CIR. CT. ADR R. 8(e) ("The mediator shall not be compelled by subpoena or otherwise to divulge any records or to testify in regard to the mediation in any adversary proceeding
or judicial forum.").
78
See VT. R. EviD. 501(b)(3) (recognizing a statutory privilege for communications made to a
"mediator, factfinder or arbitrator during a labor dispute or negotiation.").
79

See CAL. EvID. CODE § 703.5 (West 2003) (creating an exception only in contempt, criminal, or disciplinary proceedings); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3)-(4) (West 2003) (creating an exception only for mediator disciplinary proceedings); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.014(2) (West 2003)
(creating an exception only for otherwise discoverable information); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1805(F) (West 2003) (creating an exception only for actions against the mediator); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 9-19-44(b) (2003) (creating an exception only for collective bargaining agreements); GA.
ADR RULE 7(b) (creating an exception only where there are threats of violence, child abuse, third
party danger, and claims brought against a mediator or third party); MD. R. 17-109(c)-(d) (creating
an exception only where there is a signed writing providing otherwise, there is a threat of serious
bodily harm or death, or there is an allegation of mediator misconduct).
80
See, e.g., Stempel v. Stempel, 633 So.2d 26, 26-27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (approving a
"bare bones" mediation agreement mainly because there was no proof that the parties agreed to
any other terms); Chappell v. Roth, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (N.C. 2001) (invalidating a mediated
settlement agreement without breaching confidentiality on the basis that there was no "meeting of
the minds"); Montanaro v. Montanaro, 946 S.W.2d 428, 431 (Tex. App. 1997) (upholding a mediated settlement agreement without discussing the actual communications made during the mediation session).
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Confidentiality Protection at the Federal Level

At the federal level, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 re81
quires confidentiality protection in all district court-sponsored ADR programs,
although a clear national standard has yet to develop.8 2 Similarly, the circuit
courts of appeal also offer mediation programs at the appellate level, all of
which provide for confidentiality. 83 As for the executive branch, each federal
agency is required to provide ADR techniques that promote confidentiality protections. 84 However, the executive branch does have a "manifest injustice" exception to its confidentiality protections for mediators, which is discussed be85
low.

3.

The Uniform Mediation Act

In 2001, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws ("NCCUSL") 86 incorporated a strict privilege for mediator testimony into

the new Uniform Mediation Act ("UMA"). 87 The UMA was passed with an eye
toward unifying the law of mediation confidentiality throughout the United
States.88 While the Act calls for a privilege of confidentiality for communications made during a mediation, 8 9 section 6(b)(2) creates a "substantially out81
82

See 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (2000).
Compare Willis v. McGraw, 177 F.R.D. 632, 633 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (issuing a statement

refusing to involve itself in any way "in sorting out disagreements amongst the parties emanating
from the mediation process"), with FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
("The Court does not read the ADRA or its sparse legislative history as creating an evidentiary
privilege that would preclude a litigant from challenging the validity of a settlement agreement
based on events that transpired at a mediation.").
83
See Deason, supra note 3, at 40.
84

The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. § 574 (2000); see also Confidentiality

in Federal Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs, 65 Fed. Reg. 83,085 (Dec. 29, 2000).
85

See infra note 98 and accompanying text.

86

NCCUSL is now in its 112th year. The organization comprises more than 300 lawyers,

judges and law professors, appointed by the states as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico
and the U.S. Virgin Islands, to draft proposals for uniform and model laws on subjects where
uniformity is desirable and practicable, and work toward their enactment in legislatures. For more
information, see www.nccusl.org.
87

The UMA, drafted in collaboration with the American Bar Association's Section on Dispute

Resolution, establishes a privilege of confidentiality for mediators and participants. UNIFORM
MEDIATION ACT § 4 (2001), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/UMA200l .htm.
It was approved by the ABA in 2002. Id.
88

See Michael B. Getty et al., Prefaceto Symposium on Drafting a Uniform/Model Mediation

Act, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 787, 787 (1998).
89

See UNIFORM MEDITATION ACT § 4.
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weighs" exception for testimony in subsequent agreement enforcement proceedings by the parties to a mediation. 90 In justification of the exception, the comments state, "[t]his exception is designed to preserve traditional contract defenses to the enforcement of the mediated settlement agreement that relate to the
integrity of the mediation process, which otherwise would be unavailable if
excepbased on mediation communications." 9 1 It is important to note that this 92
tion is much broader than the exceptions currently allowed in most states.
However, section 6(c) declares that this "substantially outweighs" exception is inapplicable to mediator testimony. 93 While the section does allow
do so.94
the mediator to voluntarily testify, he or she may not be compelled to
Although the Act's distinction between participant testimony and mediator testimony has been openly criticized, 95 the Act's adoption of a strict privilege for
toward creating a national
mediator testimony illustrates a substantial 9trend
6
norm that exempts a mediator from testifying.
B.

JurisdictionsAllowing Mediator Testimony About Mediation Communications in Certain Agreement Enforcement Proceedings

Despite the substantial authority advocating the use of a strict mediator
privilege, the law is far from consistent. For example, the Fourth Circuit re90

See id. at § 6(b)(2). Specifically,
[t]here is no privilege under Section 4 if a court, administrative agency, or arbitrator finds, after a hearing in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence has shown that the evidence is not otherwise available, that
there is a need for the evidence that substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and that the mediation communication is sought or offered in:.
. (2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a proceeding to prove a claim
to rescind or reform or a defense to avoid liability on a contract arising out of the
mediation.

Id.
91
92

Id. at § 6(b)(2) cmt. 11.
See Robinson, supra note 5, at 170.

93

"A mediator may not be compelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication

referred to in subsection ...(b)(2)." UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 6(c).
94

See id.

See Deason, supra note 3, at 90-91; Hughes, supra note 5, at 64-66; Robinson, supra note 5,
at 171-72.
96
Although the UMA is barely two years old, it has already been adopted by Illinois, H.B.

95

2146, 93rd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (ll. 2003), and Nebraska, L.B. 255, 98th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb.
2003), and is currently on the agenda in many other states. For a good discussion of the UMA and
some suggestions to state legislatures for integrating the UMA into their laws, see Richard C.
Reuben, The Sound of Dust Settling: A Response to Criticisms of the UMA, 2003 J.DISP. RESOL.
99, 127-33.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 13
WEST VIRGINIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 107

cently stated in dicta that mediator testimony is required if it is mandated by
"manifest injustice" and is indispensable to the resolution of a subsequent dispute. 97 In addition, federal agency law requires mediator testimony if a court
98

determines that such testimony is necessary to prevent a "manifest injustice."
Similarly, a few states have created statutory exceptions that take a case-by-case
approach in deciding whether a breach of the general confidentiality rules is
necessary to resolve a subsequent dispute. 99 Moreover, some state statutes al-

low very broad exceptions to mediator confidentiality after an agreement is
reached.100 Advocates of these case-by-case approaches point out how they
grant courts considerable flexibility while at the same time limiting mediation
disadvantage
disclosures "in order to keep them rare."101 Of course, a0possible
2

of these approaches is unpredictability and inconsistency.'
There is also evidence of courts creating judicially implied exceptions to
mediator confidentiality. For example, the current status of California's confidentiality statute is unclear due to a few recent cases creating implied exceptions. t° In North Carolina, one party's claim that mediation resulted in a set97

In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 640 (4th Cir. 2002).

98

5 U.S.C. § 574(a)(4)(A) (2000).

See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(B)(1)(c) (West 2003) (requiring mediator testimony if
"[a] judicial determination of the meaning or enforceability of an agreement resulting from a
mediation procedure if the court determines that testimony concerning what occurred in the mediation proceeding is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2317.023(C)(4) (West 2003) (compelling disclosure if the information is necessary to prevent a
manifest injustice that outweighs the importance of confidentiality); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
904.085(4)(e) (West 2002) ("In an action or proceeding distinct from the dispute whose settlement
is attempted through mediation, the court may admit evidence otherwise barred by this section if
necessary to prevent a manifest injustice of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the importance of
protecting the principle of confidentiality in mediation proceedings generally."); KY. MEDIATION
R. 12(C) (allowing mediator testimony about any matter discussed during the mediation if a party
obtains an "order of the Court for good cause shown").
99

100 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-235d(b) (West 2003) (allowing the disclosure of mediation communications where they are "necessary to enforce a written agreement that came out of
the mediation"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679C.2(7) (West 2004) (creating an exception to confidentiality "'[w]hen a mediation communication or mediation document is relevant to determining the
existence of an agreement that resulted from the mediation or is relevant to the enforcement of
such an agreement"); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-103(c)(v) (Michie 2003) (recognizing no mediation privilege where "[o]ne of the parties seeks judicial enforcement of the mediated agreement").
101 See Deason, supra note 3, at 48.
102

See id.

103

See Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1133-39 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (creating

an implied exception when one party asserts the contract defense of undue influence); Rinaker v.
Superior Court, 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 469 (1998) (creating an implied exception to the statute
based upon protecting a "due process right" to cross examine a witness in a juvenile delinquency
proceeding). But see Foxgate Homeowners' Assn. v. Bramalca Cal. Inc., 25 P.3d 1117, 1125-26
(Cal. 2001) (declaring that implied exceptions to mediation confidentiality are invalid due to the
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tlement shown by an unsigned agreement led a state court to hear testimony
from a mediator. 10 The court did this in spite of statutory confidentiality protections because, in the court's view, state contract law governing oral contracts
trumped the protections.
In a Texas federal case, a mediation participant claimed that fraud had
tainted the mediation process. 106 In spite of an ironclad statute protecting mediation confidentiality, the judge decided to weigh the public policy reasons
favoring the privilege against the defendant's interest in having the mediator
testify. 107 Although the mediator's subpoena was ultimately quashed, the
judge's analysis "may have threatened confidentiality more
generally by creat' 10 8
ing new limits to the protection afforded by the statute."
Recently, a Texas state court added to the confusion surrounding its
mediation confidentiality protection by creating a judicial exception in a legal
malpractice case. 10 9 In that case, the plaintiff sued his former lawyer alleging
that the lawyer failed to adequately warn him of the consequences of accepting a
proposed settlement agreement. i When the lawyer tried to subpoena the mediator for relevant testimony, the plaintiff objected on confidentiality
grounds.III The trial court did not allow the mediator testimony on the basis of
one of Texas's confidentiality statutes. 112 On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of a common law "offensive use" doctrine. 1 13 Basically, the Court held that since the plaintiff sought affirmative relief from his
former attorney, and since the mediator was the only witness to the disputed
conversation,t 4the mediator's testimony was required since it was outcome de1

terminative.

clear and unambiguous language of the statute).
104
See Few v. Hammack Enter., Inc., 511 S.E.2d 665, 670 (N.C. 1999) ("[A] mediator is both
competent and compellable to testify or produce evidence on whether the parties reached a settlement agreement, and as to the terms of the agreement, where the judge is making that determination.").
105

Id. at 669-70; see also Deason, supra note 3, at 36.

106

See Smith v. Smith, 154 F.R.D. 661, 664 (N.D. Tex. 1994).

107

Id at 670-75.

lo

Deason, supra note 3, at 71.

109

See Alford v. Bryant, 137 S.W.3d 916 (Tex. App. 2004).

110

Id. at 918.

I

Id.at 919.

112

Id.

113

Id.at 922.

114

Id
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Finally, approximately half the states lack a comprehensive mediation
statute, which leads to "a patchwork of protections" made up of one or more of
the above approaches. 115 Thus, mediator confidentiality is still faced with a
crippling inconsistency across the country.

V. A LOOK AT WEST VIRGINIA
Until recently, West Virginia had yet to become involved in the ensuing
debate over the place of mediator testimony in agreement enforcement proceedings. While the West Virginia Trial Court Rules clearly call for a strict mediator
privilege, 116 it was still unclear as to whether a judicially implied exception,
similar to those used in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, California, North
Carolina, and Texas would surface in West Virginia case law. 117 However, in
Riner v. Newbraugh,118 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals indirectly
addressed the issue and took a stance.
A.

Evidence of a Possible Conflict in the West Virginia Trial CourtRules
West Virginia has long used a strict mediator privilege, which states:
Mediation shall be regarded as confidential settlement negotiations, subject to W. Va. R.Evid. 408. A mediator shall maintain
and preserve the confidentiality of all mediation proceedings
and records. A mediator shall keep confidential from opposing
parties information obtained in an individual session unless the
party to that session or the party's counsel authorizes disclosure.
A mediator may not be subpoenaed or called to testify or otherwise be subject to process requiring disclosure of confidential
proceeding relating to or arising out of the
information in any
1 19
dispute mediated.

of120
the rule appears to prohibit mediator testiThus, the plain language
• •
However, West Virginia also uses tradimony in nearly every circumstance.
tional contract law to enforce mediated agreements through West Virginia Trial
H5

Deason, supranote 3, at 50.

116 See W.VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.12.
117
118

See supranotes 97, 103-14 and accompanying text.
563 S.E.2d 802 (W. Va. 2002).

119

W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.12.

120

There is evidence that a mediator is permitted to testify as to general questions about

whether an agreement was reached at mediation, but the questioning is very limited. See Riner,
563 S.E.2d at 808 n.8.
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Court Rule 25.14, which states, "[i]f the parties reach a settlement and execute a
written agreement,
the,,1 21
agreement is. enforceable
in the same manner as any
•
.
other written contract.
The possibility of an inherent conflict between these
rules raises the issue of mediator testimony's proper place in agreement enforcement disputes. On one hand, one rule advocates for maintaining total confidentiality for the mediator. On the other hand, another rule concerns itself
with the effective enforcement of mediated agreements, which in turn leads to
the difficult question of whether a court should require mediator testimony when
it might provide valuable parol evidence.
B.

Riner v. Newbraugh

Despite the various arguments endorsing mediator testimony in enforcement proceedings, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals indicates
in Riner v. Newbraugh that total confidentiality surrounding mediator testimony
122
is still the governing standard in West Virginia.
1.

Facts and Procedural History

Riner involved a dispute over the enforcement of a settlement agreement reached as a result of a court-ordered mediation. 23 The dispute arose over
the development of a piece of farmland into a subdivision. 24 The Riners, owners of the land subject to dispute, filed a civil action in circuit court alleging
fraud and a breach of fiduciary duty against the defendant builders/developers. 125 Although the parties first participated in an unsuccessful
court-ordered mediation, the continuing efforts of the mediator and participants
eventually led to an agreement. 126 The mediator reduced the agreement to writing, and both he and the Riners signed. 127 The two-page agreement was then
transferred to the defendants, who chose not to sign the agreement. 12 8 Instead,
the defendants prepared a lengthier document that restated certain provisions of
the original agreement, but also added
certain provisions not specifically ad1 29
dressed at the mediation conference.
121

W.VA. TRIAL CT. R. 25.14.

122

Riner, 563 S.E.2d at 808-09.

123

Id. at 805.

124

Id. at 804.

125

Id.

126

Id. at 805.

127

Id. at 804-05.

128

Id. at 805.

129

Id.
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When the Riners refused to sign the new agreement, the defendants filed
The defendants argued that the added provisions not
a motion to enforce.
discussed at the mediation conference were impliedly included in the settlement
agreement. 13 1 Two hearings were held on the issue at which testimony was
offered by the Riners' former counsel, the defendants' counsel, Mr. Riner, and
the mediator. 32 The testimony of the mediator consisted of the following:
THE COURT: There obviously has been a release prepared beyond the date of the settlement agreement in the case. The parties are alleging, primarily the Plaintiffs

. .

., that certain terms

within the settlement agreement and releases go beyond the
pale, go beyond the original agreement that was dated the 5th
day of September of 2000, and either embrace new material or
work a greater or different settlement than envisioned in your
September 5th document, you're aware of that?
THE WITNESS: I am aware of that.
THE COURT: You are unaware of any particulars as to what
alleged maybe [sic] larger ambit of the proposed settlement
agreement release that was prepared by the Defendants?
THE WITNESS: I am guessing because I know what the nature
of the lawsuit was, essentially involved dissolution of a business
entity existing between the Newbraughs and the Riners. Because of that I anticipated there was going to be probably a
pretty substantial release that both sides were going to want to
neither one of them could throw rocks at them in
make sure 13that
3
the future.
The circuit court, relying heavily on the mediator's testimony, found
134
that any agreement between the parties was meant to "insure a clean break.'"
Accordingly, the circuit court ruled that it could "find no substantive area of
disagreement or misunderstanding that was not resolved by the [mediation settlement] Agreement, which appears to the Court to be a valid, fair and enforce-

130

Id.

131
132

Id. at 808.
Id. at 805.

133

Id. at 808.

134

Id. ("The trial court, in making its ruling, obviously relied upon the mediator's testimony.").

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss1/13

20

Rogers: Riner v. Newbraugh: The Role of Mediator Testimony in the Enforce

2004]

RINER v. NE WBRA UGH

able settlement agreement."' 135 Thus, the Riners
were subsequently ordered to
136
sign the defendants' version of the agreement.
2.

Holding

On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reversed and
invalidated the agreement on the basis that there was no "meeting of the minds,"
which is an essential element to all valid contracts. 137 Interestingly, although
neither party raised concern over the testimony of the mediator, the court went
out of its way to express its disapproval with the use of mediator testimony in
these types of proceedings. Specifically, the court stated:
While the trial court's questioning of the mediator ensued due
to his presence having been secured by subpoena, we question
the wisdom of permitting the mediator to testify in the fashion
allowed in this case. To the mediator's credit, he informed the
trial court prior to his testimony that the trial court rules prohibit
him from subsequently testifying for trial purposes ....

While

it does not appear that the mediator disclosed any confidential
information through his testimony, and neither party has raised
such a claim, the trial court's questioning of the mediator went
beyond the basic issue of whether in fact an agreement was
reached and identifying the terms of that agreement ....

While

we do not approve of the trial court's entire line of questioning
of the mediator, we do not find a violation of TCR 25.12 due to
the non-disclosure by the mediator of confidential information
discussed during the mediation process.138
Although the court found no violation of the rule, its comments clearly signal
the court's disapproval of breaching mediator confidentiality in subsequent enforcement proceedings.
Interestingly, the court's holding suggests that mediators can testify on
the basic issue of whether an agreement was reached and the terms of that
agreement. Nonetheless, the court's criticism of the lower court proceedings
still indicates that specific questioning about the settlement process is off limits.
Thus, after Riner it appears that in West Virginia, at least for now, the mediator's confidentiality will take precedence in proceedings initiated to enforce

135

Id at 805.

136

Id.

137

Id. at 809.

138

Id.at 808-09.
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mediated agreements. 139 Moreover, reading the court's comments in this man-

ner provides some much needed consistency for the future of mediation in West
Virginia.
3.

Possible Consequences

West Virginia's use of a strict mediator privilege results in at least two

main consequences to the mediation process. First, it appears that West Virginia
mediators may now tell their clients with reasonable confidence that they will
not be testifying as to any mediation communication at any subsequent state
court proceeding.14 0 This promotes the informality and candor that is so crucial
to the mediation process.141

Second, the unavailability of mediator testimony to a dissatisfied participant illustrates the importance of setting out a clear, definite settlement

agreement in writing at the end of each successful mediation. Without the aid of
mediator testimony, the drafter of a settlement agreement needs to assure that
every term is adequately defined and discussed. 142 Due to these concerns, some

states have enacted mandatory writing requirements. 143 In fact, if confidentiality is going to continue to take precedence, a bright-line rule requiring a formal
signed writing may be
the next step in the continuing development of West Vir144
ginia mediation law.
One possible downside to maintaining a strict mediator privilege is the
weakening of traditional contract law defenses such as fraud, duress, and mistake, all of which become much more difficult to prove without the aid of neu-

tral testimony. 145 In other words, the lack of mediator testimony may hamper
the ability of contract law to decipher whether a valid settlement agreement was
formed with the proper consent of the participants. After all, the Riner court did
139 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 167. See generally Johnson, supra note 16, at 190-9 1.
140 Things are still a little murky at the federal level due to the "manifest injustice" exception to
confidentiality adopted by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
141 See supra notes 17-43 and accompanying text.
142

See Deason, supra note 3, at 75 ("Settling a lawsuit involves releasing rights that would

otherwise be pursued in court. This is a decision of significance, and a court's determination that
such an agreement was actually reached should be based on more than who wins the credibility
contest in a swearing match.").
143 Writing requirements vary in degree and complexity, and are outside the scope of this
Comment. However, for a good discussion of writing requirements, see Deason, supra note 3, at
5 1-60.
144 But see Thompson, supranote 5, at 551 (arguing that "technical, specialized rules in mediations such as a statute of frauds, that conflict with custom, practice, or reasonable expectations,
will create confusion, uncertainty, and litigation").
145 See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
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clarify that "we do recognize that the mediation process will only work while
the parties are ensured that the process is fair to , both
sides and where the at,.146
Therefore, the profestainment of settlement is viewed as non-compulsory.
sionalism of both the mediator
and
the
participants
during
the mediation is of
147
the utmost importance.
VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, as the practice of mediation continues to gain support
throughout the country, it becomes increasingly important to define the scope of
the confidentiality protections surrounding its communications. Currently, jurisdictions are having trouble deciding the proper role of mediator testimony in
the enforcement of mediated agreements. Some jurisdictions are continuing to
apply a strict mediator privilege, which allows a mediator to refuse from testifying about mediation communications in any agreement enforcement proceeding.
On the opposite end of the spectrum, some jurisdictions either offer only slight
protection for mediators or have now created broad exceptions that view mediator testimony as an essential element to a court's ability to decipher the truth
behind mediated agreements. Not surprisingly, several jurisdictions wind up
somewhere in the middle of these two extremes.
The ensuing debate over the proper role of mediator testimony in enforcement proceedings has led to a crippling inconsistency throughout the country. As a result, mediators are often unable to guarantee that they will keep everything said in a mediation session confidential if a dissatisfied participant later
becomes unhappy with an agreement and subpoenas mediator testimony.
Thankfully, the emergence of the Uniform Mediation Act and various judicially
implied exceptions should bring this topic some much-deserved attention.
In West Virginia, at least for now, the standard is set. Through its recent opinion of Riner v. Newbraugh, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has indirectly supplied some much-needed guidance. After Riner, West
Virginia mediators may now perform their duties of solving problems and encouraging compromise without the threat of a future subpoena complicating the
process. However, the absence of neutral testimony will now place a greater
importance on the formality of settlement agreements and the professionalism of
the participants.
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Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802, 810 (W. Va. 2002).
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See Hughes, supra note 5, at 72-77 (explaining the "downside to confidentiality when it is

used to conceal negligent or intentional misconduct by either the parties or the mediator"). It
should be noted that confidentiality and privilege rules tend to be much looser when the mediator
is accused of actual wrongdoing. See Thompson, supra note 5, at 528.
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